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A BILL TO REGULATE EXPERT TESTIMONY."
2
EDwin R. KEEDY, Chairman.
The American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology at its
meeting in Washington, D. C., on October 22, 1914, unanimously approved the following bill, which was presented by the committee on
insanity and criminal responsibility. 1
SECTION 1.-Sun&oning of Witnesses by Court. Where the existence of mental disease or derangement on the part of any person
becomes an issue in the trial of a case, the judge of the trial court may
summon one or more disinterested qualified experts, not exceeding
three, to testify at the trial. In case the judge shall issue the summons
before the trial is begun, he shall notify counsel for both parties of
the witnesses so summoned. Upon the trial of the case, the witnesses
summoned by the court may be cross-examined by counsel for both
parties in the case. Such summoning of witnesses by the court shall
not preclude either party from using other expert witnesses at the
trial.
SECTION 2.-Exalmination of Accused by State's Witness. In
criminal cases, no testimony regarding the mental condition of the
accused shall be received from witnesses summoned by the accused
until the expert witnesses summoned by the prosecution have been
given an opportunity to examine the accused.
SECTIoN 3.-Commitment to Hospital for Observation. Whenever in the trial of a criminal case the existence of mental disease on
the part of the accused, either at the time of the trial or at the time
of the commission of the alleged wrongful act, becomes an issue in
the case, the judge of the court before which the accused is to be tried
or is being tried shall commit the accused to the State Hospital for
the Insane, to be detained there for purposes of observation until
further order of court. The court shall direct the superintendent
of the hospital to permit all the expert witnesses summoned in the case
to have free access to the accused for purposes of observation. The
'Fourth Report of Committee B of the Institute.

2The membership of the committee is as follows:
Edwin R. Keedy (professor of law in Northwestern University), Chairman.
Adolf Meyer (professor of psychiatry in Johns Hopkins University), Baltimore.
Harold N. Moyer (physician), Chicago.
W. A. White (superintendent Government Hospital for the Insane), Washington.
William E. Mikell (dean of the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania), Philadelphia.
Albert C. Barnes (judge of the Superior Court), Chicago.
Morton Prince (physician), Boston.
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court may also direct the chief physician of the hospital to prepare
a report regarding the mental condition of the acused. This report
may be introduced in evidence at the trial under the oath of said chief
physician, who may be cross-examined regarding the report by counsel
for both sides.
SEcTioN 4.-Written Report by Witness. Each expert witness
may prepare a written report upon the mental condition of the person
in question, and such report may be read by the witness at the trial.
If the witness presenting the report was called by one of the opposing
parties, he may be cross examined regarding his report by counsel for
the other party. If the witness was summoned by the court, he may
be cross-examined regarding his report by counsel for both parties.
SEcTiON 5.-Consultation of Witnesses. Where expert witnesses
have examined the person whose mental condition is an element in the
case, they may consult before testifying, with or without the direction
of the court, and may prepare a joint report to be introduced at the
trial.
Section 1 applies to civil and criminal cases.
The purpose of this section is to secure the testimony of disinterested witnesses which may go to the jury along with the testimony
of the witnesses for the prosecution and defense. Under the present
system, a criminal trial where expert testimony is employed generally
resolves itself into a contest between the opposing witnesses, whose
contradictory opinions often confuse, rather than enlighten, the jury.
Such divergence of opinions must exist in the very nature of the ease,
for each party calls only those witnesses whose opinions are in accord
with the theory of that side. The situation in this respect has been
well described by Sir George Jessel, Master of the Rolls in Thorn v.
Worthing Skating Rink Co., L. R. 6. Ch. Div. note 415, 416: "Now
in the present instance I have, as usual, the evidence of experts on the
one side and on the other, and as usual, the experts do not agree in
their opinion. There is no reason why they should. As I have often
explained, since I have had the honor of a seat on this bench, the
opinion of an expert may be honestly obtained, and it may be quite
different from the opinion of another expert, also honestly obtained.
But the mode in which expert evidence is obtained is such as not to
give the fair result of scientific opinion to the court. A man may
go, and does sometimes, to half a dozen experts. He takes their honest
opinion; he finds three in his favor and three against him; he says
to the three in his favor, 'will you be kind enough to give evidence?'
He pays the ones against him their fees and leaves them alone; the
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other side does the same. It may not be three out of six, it may be
three out of fifty. * * * I am sorry to say the result is that the
court does not get the assistance from the experts which, if they were
unbiased and fairly chosen, it would have a right to expect." A similar
statement was made by one of the medical members of this committee
in the New York Medical Journal, in July, 1908. It is suggested
that the proposal in section 1 will tend to counteract the evils of the
system described above.
Section 2 applies to criminal cases only. This section will enable
witnesses for the prosecution, who at present, in most eases, are limited
to opinion evidence, to testify as to the actual condition of the defendant. In this way the necessity for the much-abused and much-criticized
hypothetical question will be considerably lessened. It is submitted
that section 2 does not violate the constitutional provision against selfincrimination. (See Wigmore on Evidence, §2265.) In People vs.
Kemmler, 119 N. Y. 580, 584, the Court of Appeals of New York said:
"It is urged that the court erred in permitting the physicians, called
as witnesses for the people, to testify as to the mental condition of the
prisoner. The argument is that either the relation of patient and
physician existed, or else the prisoner was compelled to furnish evidence against himself. These physicians were sent to the jail by the
district attorney to make an examination of the prisoner's mental
and physical condition. On the stand they were not inquired of
as to the conversation had with him, or as to the transactions in the
jail. Their testimony was simply their opinion of his mental condition, as they saw him in his cell and in the court room, but they gave
no evidence of his statements of his physical condition. Such evidence
is quite unobjectionable."
Section 3, which is applicable to criminal cases only, does not
present a new idea. Maine,2 New Hampshire,' Massachusetts 4 and
Vermont 5 have statutes providing for the commitment of a defendant,
who is relying upon mental disease as a defense, to a hospital for purposes of observation. According to the language of the Maine and
Vermont statutes, the report of the superintendent is final on the
question of the defendant's condition, for they provide that the accused shall be detained and observed "that the truth or falsity of the
plea (of insanity) may be ascertained." The Virginia legislature at
2

Rev. Stat., 1903, ch. 138, sec. 1.

sLaws of 1911, ch. 13, sec. 1.
4
Acts
5

of 1909, ch. 504, sec. 103.
Pub. Stat., 1906, sec. 2307.
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its last session (1914), enacted a statute6 providing that the trial judge
may commit an accused person to a hospital for purposes of observation. The statute also empowers the judge to appoint qualified experts
to examine the accused before this commitment and to report the
results of their examination to the judge. The establishment in large
cities of psychopathic institutes, such as the one recently started in
Chicago in connection with the Municipal Court, would facilitate
greatly the examination and study of persons mentally diseased or
deficient.
Section 4, which covers both civil and criminal cases, will enable
the expert witness to present a much more accurate and connected
description of the defendant's mental condition, particularly with
reference to the symptoms of his disease. Under the present system,
by which the opinion of the witness must be drawn out by a series of
questions put up by counsel, witnesses often feel that they are unable
to present an adequate diagnosis of defendant's condition, and to express a full and convincing opinion regarding his powers of judgment
and decision. Such a plan as is proposed in section 4 has worked successfully in Scotland. The medical witness in a Scottish criminal trial,
after an examination of the defendant, prepares a written report which
he files with the clerk of the court. At the trial, after the witness
has been sworn and has qualified as an expert, he reads his report to
the jury. The counsel for the party which has called the witness may
ask any explanatory questions, and the witness is then cross-examined
by the counsel for the other side.
Section 5, which is applicable to both kinds of cases, is simply for
the purpose of saving time and eliminating any possibility for misunderstanding, where the experts are able to agree in their opinions.
6Acts of 1914, ch. 313.

(Remarks1 by Hon. Orrin N. Carter, Justice of Illinois Supreme
Court, relative to bill to regulate expert testimony.)
A BILL TO REGULATE EXPERT TESTIMONY.
Mr. Chairman: Ordinarily I am reluctant to have the Institute
pass a resolution in favor of special or particular legislation, because
generally we do not have time here to give full consideration to the
subject. This matter we are now discussing, however, I consider an
exception. Few subjects have been given the exhaustive investigation
before reporting that has been given by the committee to this. From
my own personal experience and observation there is another reason
I think why we should make an exception in this matter; the great
majority of people who have given it any study fully agree that there
should be a change in regard to the calling and examination of expert
witnesses. Many people believe that experts testify for the side
which will pay them the most, and that they ought not to be called
by the litigants. Lawyers, as well as laymen, think our system of
calling and examining experts should be changed.
I have given the subject of this report considerable thought,
but a judge of a court of last resort does not wish to express an
opinion on constitutional questions before they come to him in due
course, and hence I would not wish to express publicly whether I
thought this recommendation in all respects would be constitutional.
I deem it entirely proper to say, however, that judges of courts are
reasonable men, and that most members of courts of last resort are
very anxious to uphold the constitutionality of a statute that is based
on reason and good sense. Indeed, many good lawyers think that the
courts of many of the states are too ready to yield to public opinion
and stretch the constitution in order to hold constitutional certain
laws along new lines embodying the ideas of the time. I am not here
to discuss whether that be true or not.
I think the chairman of this committee is right in saying, if you
do not allow the defendant in a criminal case to call experts, if he
desires to do so, that there is grave danger of the law being held unconstitutional in some, if not all, of the states. Not only that, but
such a law would not strike the ordinary person as being fair. Judges,
as well as laymen, are desirous of having the laws treat everyone
iMade at the meeting of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology,
in Washington, D. C., on October 22, 1914.
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fairly; a defendant accused of crime should have a right to be heard
and--so far as reasonably consistent with the due course of lawto present his evidence in the way that he wishes. The present method
of calling and examining expert witnesses is not only unfair, but
often brings most disastrous results.
We naturally draw on our personal experiences in discussing
changes in the law. For nearly twelve years I presided over a court
in Chicago, in which all persons whose sanity was questioned were
tried. The question of expert witnesses was often called to my attention, as it has been frequently in a striking way in the court of which
I am now a member. In a recent murder trial that came before the
Supreme Court of Illinois for review, the question of the sanity
of the defendant was raised. Expert testimony had not been put in,
at least in a proper way, in the trial below. The members of the
Supreme Court of Illinois would have been much better satisfied in
passing on that case if the testimony as to the sanity of the defendant had been properly presented. From the record we could not
satisfactorily reach a conclusion as to whether the man was insane,
or was what is commonly known as a degenerate. On an appeal to
the Governor to commute or reprieve the defendant, he called in
experts to make an examination. The court would very gladly have
considered the testimony of those experts, if they had been called on
the trial.
This report recommends that pending the investigation before
the criminal trial, the defendant be taken to the asylum for the insane and kept. I have talked with Prof. Keedy about some of the
difficulties in the way of enforcing that provision, unless the law is
carefully drawn. In Illinois we have five state institutions, as I recall
the number, where the insane are cared for. The law should be so
drawn that the defendant would be taken to the nearest state asylum.
I suggested, among other things, to Prof. Keedy that I had some doubt
as to the practicability of such a law, as the expense and delay in the
trial would be too great, but he stated in reply that the plan had been
tried in other jurisdictions and found to be practical. That is the
real and true test of such a plan as this. If it works successfully
in some states it ought to work successfully in all the states, if the
law is carefully drawn. Of course I cannot guarantee that this
draft of the law is drawn in the right way. If it is, it is the first time
that I have ever known the first draft of a new law to be so drawn.
I have never seen any statute where lawyers would not disagree as
to its meaning. Indeed, Mr. Chairman, I have written opinions, now
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in the books, as to the meaning of parts of which lawyers have taken
diametrically opposite views, when in writing the opinion I did not
intend to have it construed as either of the lawyers contended. I
have sometimes thought that the great Frenchman, Talleyrand, was
right when he said that language was meant to conceal rather than
to express thought.
I am very much in favor of this law, so drafted in each state as
to meet the conditions in that state. Of course this will not do away
entirely with such foolishness as Prof. Keedy has called attention to
in this report, where a hypothetical question was presented which
took half a day to read to the witness. I have no doubt, though, that
such a law as this will prove of great use in remedying many of the
evils that now exist in reference to the calling and examination of
expert witnesses. Lawyers and courts are probably much to blame
for the condition that now exists, especially as to allowing such unreasonable questions as just referred to. Agitation and education
should force courts and lawyers to put a stop to that sort of an examination. We can bring about that result by concerted action. I cannot emphasize too strongly, Mr. Chairman, my desire to see enacted
in every state, a statute modelled along the line of the suggestions
offered in this report.

(Editorialby John H. Wigmore in Illinois Law .Review for
December, 1914.)
THE BILL TO REGULATE EXPERT TESTIMONY.
At last it would seem that the lamentable conditions of expert
testimony, under the present law and practice, have some prospect
of improvement.
More than fifty years ago, Lord Chancellor Campbell, speaking
of experts' testimony (Tracy Peerage Case, 10 Cl. & F. 154) said
pessimistically, "Hardly any weight should be given to their evidence"; and since that time, still harsher sayings have been uttered
by judges. In spite of much study of the problem, no solution has
commanded acceptance.
The reasons for this lamentable condition of things lie partly in
the inherent nature of such testimony and partly in the law. But
the law's part of the fault has been that it has not sought to adjust
itself explicitly to the special conditions. The ordinary rules did not
suffice, and some adjustment was needed, before things could improve. But for this purpose some understanding by both parties-.
lawyers and scientists-of each other's limitations was indispensable,
and some concessions on each side. This understanding and these
concessions lacking, no progress was possible.
But at last the attempt has been made to confer and agree, and
the result promises to be a solution of this long standing problemso far at least as its solution depends upon legal practice, and not on
the ethical behavior of the two professions. A committee of the
American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, with Professor Edwin R. Keedy as chairman, has been working on the subject
for the past three years. The four medical members of the committee represent the widest experience and a national fame: Adolph
Meyer, director of the psychiatric hospital of Johns Hopkins University; Morton Prince, professor of psychiatry in Boston University;
William A. White, superintendent of the Federal Hospital for the
Insane at Washington; and Harold N. Moyer, of the Chicago Medical Society. The lawyers' names are equally a guarantee of experience and sound judgment: Albert C. Barnes, judge of the Superior
Court of Cook County; William E. Mikell, dean and professor of
criminal law in the law school of the University of Pennsylvania;
and the chairman, who made a study of the subject in two foreign
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countries. If this weighty body of opinion, after the fullest discussion, can be brought into agreement, and proposes something as an
adequate measure of reform, the rest of us may well be satisfied to
accept it. We mean this literally; our profession can afford to give
full faith and credit to the proposal of such a body.
And what is this measure? It consists of five sections; each one
of them aims to remedy one aspect of the complex problem; and the
combined effect of the five is to remedy all of the most serious shortcomings of the present practice, and thus to do in one enactment all
that the law itself can do under present conditions.
Section 1 empowers the judge to summon expert witnesses (selected by himself or by parties' agreement), in addition to those
summoned by the parties. This is the first needed step to eliminating
the extreme evil of hired partisanship, but it wisely does so by trusting to the greater moral weight of a judge-selected expert, instead
of attempting to create an exclusive and permanent body of official
experts; for the latter measure (often proposed by medical men) is
both impracticable and un-American.
Section 2 provides that in criminal cases (on the sanity issue)
the expert medical witnesses offered by the prosecution shall have
equal opportunity with those of the defence to examine the accused.
This removes one important source of unfair use of expert testimony
to becloud a case. It will also much lessen the need for the muchabused hypothetical question.
Section 3 empowers the judge, on a sanity issue in a criminal
case to place the accused in a hospital for observation by all the
expert witnesses. This, again, removes one of the present means of
juggling with testimony, and furnishes the condition on which scientific and impartial alienists depend for forming a safe and useful
judgment.
Section 4 permits the expert witness to read, as his direct testimony, his report in writing, subject then to cross-examination. Here,
once more, the legal limitation is removed which leads to so much
of the artificial partisanship now obtaining, and is so irksome to the
true and impartial scientist. The condition is furnished which will
make the witness-box seem more natural to the medical practitioner,
without abandoning any of the traditional safeguards of the law.
Section 5 permits the experts to consult before trial, and to prepare a joint report if desired. Here, too, legal practice is allowed
to conform to the normal practice of all reputable medical practitioners in dealing with a serious case. The false and futile forcing
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of medical men to disagree, and the foolish bear-baiting so absurd in
a quest for truth, is made needless under the law, if the practitioners
are disposed to take the opportunity.
Now the notable ting about these measures is that the last four
of them are merely measures which bring the law into conformity
with all reputable medical and other scientific practice. They are
measures which the medical profession has long demanded. The perverse thing about our law has been that it flew in the face of facts.
It has complacently e'xpected to get at the truth without methods
which are always used in getting at the truth in ordinary scientific
practice. The law does not mean to be foolish, and lawyers as a
class are not chargeable with stupidity. But it is simply preverse
childishness to ignore in legal trials of truth, when expert aid is
invoked, the indispensable methods which the experts themselves use
and must use' in their own work outside of court. If the law will
give up this perversity, and will look facts in the face, it may expect
to obtain results worthy of its mission; but not otherwise.
There is nothing in this bill to frighten the lawyer. There is
nothing in it to discourage the expert witness. There is everything
in it that can satisfy the needs of both classes.
The significant fact is that it has commanded the support of
seasoned representatives of both professions. At the October meeting of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, in
Washington, the report was adopted. The proposal has been adopted
by the Committee on Expert Testimony of the Council on Health
and Public Instruction of the American Medical Association, and will
be presented to the next Conference on Medical Legislation. The
same bill will this winter be laid before committees of the American
Bar Association and of the National Conference of Commissioners
of Uniform State Laws, as also of the American Neurological Association. If it receives the approval of these bodies, the prospect is
that it will be favorably accepted in the state legislatures soon thereafter.
And so a light is dawning on a problem which has long vexed
two great professions.

